model and concludes with a discussion of the factors supporting the BOA's success and assessing its long-term prospects.
The Organizing Model
The 'organizing model' is understood here in terms of both internal and external organizing (Connolly, Marino and Martinez Lucio, 2017; Heery, Simms, Delbridge, Salmon and Simpson, 2000; Hurd, 2004) . Internal organizing refers to mobilizing and stimulating activism among already existing union members. External organizing describes practices that contribute to membership growth, such as targeted organizing campaigns in workplaces where there is as yet no union presence (Heery et al., 2000: 996) . Although the main focus of BOA has been external organizing (especially in low-density Estonia), internal organizing has also been relevant (Häkkinen, 2013: 11-13 ).
The organizing model developed in the 1980s and 90s as a union response to the virulently anti-union environment of the United States (US). Advocates of the model have promoted mobilization of current and potential union members and a set of aggressive union tactics, which when taken together have improved union 'win-rates' in the National Labor Relations Board representation elections which are typically the focus of US organizing campaigns (cf. Bronfenbrenner, 1997) . The model assumes a hostile management which unions counter by mobilizing rank and file workers. Unions organize in secret for as long as possible, preparing workers mentally for a management onslaught, researching the vulnerabilities of targeted firms and building rank and file organization. This process encourages workers to 'reimagine' their interests as collective and class-based, in opposition to management (Simms, 2012) . In short, the frame takes conflict as given, and emphasizes tactics which have been proven effective (Bronfenbrenner, 1997) , though under an admittedly narrow set of assumptions (de Turberville, 2004) .
The model has been criticized on many fronts. Union officials focused on partnership and membership servicing sometimes oppose the organizing model because they believe it competes with their own goals and priorities (Fiorito, 2004) . Although emphasizing grassroots mobilization, it is staff-driven, following a strict playbook, and implemented by professional organizers (Fletcher and Hurd, 2001) . Unlike partnership, which focuses on process legitimacy and compromise, the organizing model emphasizes specific goals, and mobilizes resources such as staff, political influence and worker support, to achieve those goals. It requires unions to allocate resources which might have been used elsewhere. This is arguably facilitated by a strong central leadership (Krzywdzinski, 2010) , which is however in service of a rank-and-file based mobilizing strategy (Milkman, 2006) . The apparent uniformity of the organizing model as a one-size-fits-all approach belies the complex environments and organizing challenges unions face in difference contexts (de Turberville, 2004) .
Some question its potential to succeed as a macro revitalization strategy for the labour movement as a whole because the obsessive focus with organizing practice neglects broader issues of rebuilding class power (Simms, 2012; Simms and Holgate, 2010) . Related to this, organizing is often seen only as a way to bring in new members and increase union density, leaving aside the issue of empowering and mobilizing existing union members (Connolly et al., 2017: 321-322 ).
In practice unions adjust the model to local circumstances. Lessons from the 'organizing model' have proven attractive to unions in many countries, including highly regulated industrial relations systems such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark. Inevitably, this has involved adaptation to local conditions. The end goals of organizing campaigns differ from one country to another, since these usually involve building workplace institutions, and the forms these take depend on national labour law. For example, in Germany organizing emphasizes establishing works councils instead of signing collective agreements (Turner, 2009) . For Dutch unions, internal organizing, or mobilizing and activating the membership, is usually more important than winning collective agreements per se, since the legal extension of collective agreements means that workers are typically already covered.
However, the enforcement of these agreements requires shop-floor union leverage which can be achieved through internal organizing, which strengthens the unions' legitimacy by promoting reforms and democratisation within unions. This does not exclude external organizing, which the Dutch unions also do, to extend union representation and regulation to previously unorganized groups of workers (Connolly et al., 2017) . Arnholtz et al. (2016) note that organizing advocates in Denmark 'translate' the organizing model in ways which legitimate it in the Danish context, selecting only the parts which they regard as well suited to Denmark's high union-density, highly institutionalized context.
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) unions face weak institutional contexts and low union density. In some ways this environment is similar to the US, and could theoretically be fertile ground for external organizing. An important limitation has been, however, that CEE unions lack the resources for organizing. Furthermore, they are often caught in a tradition of servicing unionism inherited from state socialist times. Polish unions, and in particular Solidarność, enthusiastically adopted the organizing model in the late 1990s, inspired by international cooperation and the entrance of a new generation of unionist into union leadership. Polish organizing, however, has had to fight for its budget share and remains relatively small scale (Krzywdzinski, 2010) .
The Transnationalism Frame
Compared to the organizing model, union transnationalism represents a broader field of activities, with more varied ideological underpinnings. While much of it can be understood as conventional trade union interest micropolitics within firms (Greer and Haupmeier, 2012) , or the geographical expansion of union activities to regain bargaining leverage lost to globalization (Lillie, 2004) , at the EU level unions push pro-integrationist and social dialogue agendas, shaped by the EU's political opportunity structure (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013) . There is also an international campaigning undercurrent (Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 2004) and many examples of cooperation motivated by radical leftist internationalism (Durrenberger, 2009) .
It is unusual for unions to directly organize members across national boundaries. International organizing assistance usually occurs in partnership with local unions supported by foreign unions' finances, training and sometimes solidarity. A recent failed effort proving the rule is the German construction union IG BAU's initiative to establish a European Migrant Workers Union (EMWU).
The EMWU accepted members from any industry or country, and tried to establish effective representation for Polish migrant workers in Germany. It encountered resistance from other German unions jealous of their jurisdiction. It also had difficulty recruiting migrant members. Its resources were eventually absorbed back into IG BAU (Greer, Ciupijus and Lillie, 2013) . On the other hand, the London-based International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) Seafarers' Section has maintained for decades a successful global bargaining system allowing for direct seafarer membership, although these bargaining rights are normally transferred to member unions. The ITF's situation is unusual in that 'organizing' is mostly through secondary action, so convincing the seafarers to join is useful but not essential (Lillie, 2005) , obviating the problem of recruiting workers into a 'foreign' union.
The Social Partnership Frame
'Social partnership' in some contexts is defined as mutual gains bargaining (Kelly, 2004) , but its Nordic implementation is heavily imbued with a social regulatory role for unions. In Finland, it is more common to use the term 'labour market parties', recognizing the role of regulated conflict in Nordic labour policy (Kettunen, 2012) . Since industrialization in the 1970s and 80s, strong national social partner relations in Finland have been backed by a societal consensus supportive of the role of unions, and nearly universal union membership. Unions assure membership through shop steward networks and a Ghent-system linkage of membership to unemployment benefits (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 2006) . External organizing has not been important, because there has not been anyone to organize. Unions regard themselves as partners in national politics, with a role in shaping Finland's political-economy and safeguarding its competitiveness. This role is sometimes at tension with collective action or 'movement' (Kettunen, 2004: 305) , such as organizing often entails.
In Estonia social partnership is weak -although unions strive for it -and at the national level often takes an 'illusory' form (Woolfson and Kallaste, 2011) . With low membership levels and withdrawal of state support, Estonian unions have lost the financial stability and policy influence which was the legacy of their state-socialist heritage and subsequent EU promotion of their social partner role (ibid.).
Due to employers' disinterest, sectoral bargaining is rare and most collective agreements are company level. Unions mainly operate through peaceful collective bargaining and routine servicing of existing members. The lack of a union protest culture hampers the use of more aggressive tactics (Kall, 2017) .
Finnish and Estonian unionists value their membership servicing and social partnership regulatory roles, which involve a mind-set in conflict with that of the organizing model. However, in line with de Turberville (2007) servicing is not incompatible with organizing. Social partnership relies on union power resources (Turner, 1998) , which in some cases depend on organizing. In the absence of union power resources, partnership either collapses, or becomes a legitimation tool for management or the state (Woolfson and Kallaste, 2011) . The organizational infrastructure of social partnership and servicing, in the absence of continuing struggle to establish unions' position in society, can over time result in unions no longer having the ability to mobilize workers. In such cases, implementing 'organizing unionism' requires changes in union structures, personnel and identity (Voss and Shermann, 2000; Krzywdzinski, 2010) . The introduction of organizing is sometimes opposed by unionists who believe it wastes resources which could be used for servicing, or disrupts existing trust relations with management. These tensions between organizing, partnership and servicing are inevitable, and managing them is an integral part of adopting the organizing model.
Identity Work
Transnational union organizing cooperation requires organizational innovation both in terms of transnational linkages as well as the development of an organizing model. Both dimensions require 'identity work', to bring about the oppositional and campaigning orientation needed to organize and deepen the mutual trust needed for successful transnational cooperation. 'Identity work' refers to 'anything people do, individually or collectively, to give meaning to themselves or others' (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock, 1996: 115) . During the process collective (or individual) identities are created, sustained and modified (Snow and Anderson, 1987; Snow and McAdam, 2000) . Identity construction, as a form of identity work is, according to Snow and McAdam (2000: 53) , facilitated by framing, collective action, or a combination of the two. As concluded by Benford and Snow (2000: 612) , 'framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements.' Framing is a processual phenomenon entailing mobilizing ideas and meanings, with an important role for agency and the generation of interpretative frames for identity (and reality) construction (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614) .
The identity work concept has been applied to union transnationalism by Greer and Hauptmeier (2012) , who emphasize its role in sustaining cooperation between unions in different production sites at General Motors (GM) Europe. They point out that transnational coalitions between unions lack institutional support and, following Cooke (2005) , note that because of this, local unions face a prisoners' dilemma when acting collectively. In order not to be undermined by management whipsawing, GM unions needed to change the rules of the game. Through identity work over time GM unions have constructed a common interest and purpose, countering management efforts to confound their cooperation. This was accomplished through a framing and trust building process involving face-to-face interactions, formal and informal socializing, and educating and mobilizing workers (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2012) . Identity work allowed the unionists to overcome the limitations of existing institutional infrastructure and embedded identities, permitting adaptation to changing productive structures and management strategies.
The Double Barrier
Transnational organizing involves overcoming a double barrier, to change into organizing unions and to organize workers in another country. In the current case, identity work enabled the unions not only to build cooperation by reframing their interests, but also shifted those unions' identities to prioritize organizing, which formerly had been considered in conflict with their principles. Both Finnish and Estonian unions hold to their own versions of 'social partnership', and some unionists regard the organizing model as threatening to this.
In some respects, the organizing and transnational cooperation frames overlap, in emphasizing trade union solidarity and mutual aide, as well as strategic innovation and adaptation to changing economic environments. Still, 'transnational cooperation' covers a wide variety of activities and perspectives (Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 2004) while organizing is focused. In the Finland-Estonia case previous cooperation was built on a transnational social partnership paradigm. Overcoming the double barrier required constructing the organizing model frame on top of an earlier process of transnational identity work, out of which a cadre of union officials and activists emerged committed to organizing and rebuilding union strength in a joined labour market.
Methodology
The literature suggests that there are many barriers to implementing the organizing model in different national contexts and especially transnationally. The main question guiding the current research was:
How have the Estonian and Finnish unions surmounted these barriers? Answering this question involved analysing the process of identity work and union strategic decision making, through triangulating three types of data sources: interview testimony, (participant) observations and documentary material over several years. Although Estonian unions were to some extent also supported by the Swedish and Danish unions, the article concentrates on the Finnish-Estonian cooperation as the most extensive one. It is acknowledged that one limitation of the study is that no detailed research was conducted on actors from other Nordic and Baltic countries, which would have provided more generalizability to the arguments. The data was thematically coded and analysed to trace the development of trans-Baltic cooperation over more than a decade, to see changes in strategy, structures, and collective action frames.
Exporting the Finnish Model to Estonia
Since the early 1990s, Finnish unionists have tried to guide the Estonians towards the Finnish model of coordinated industry level bargaining and social dialogue. Finnish unions tended to regard their system as a superior model for weaker labour movements to follow. This attitude fuelled a 'big brother mentality', assuming Estonians could follow the same path, minimizing cultural differences and local particularities (Skulason and Jääskeläinen, 2000) . One official from the Finnish Metalworkers' Union (Metalliliitto) critically explained this attitude: /.../ Look, [we told them] we are strong, we have high organization rates and the funniest part was that we insisted that they should have a dialogue with the employers, when the employers didn't want to have a dialogue with them. But we insisted that you should find a way to have a dialogue with the employers. showed interest, however (Häkkinen, 2013: 6) . The Latvians were least willing to take part, one reason being that they were concerned about being controlled by the Nordic unions. A former Estonian BOA coordinator related (December 2014) that the Latvians unequivocally stated 'give us money and we will see ourselves what we will do, you are not coming to teach us'. In the end, the Finns, Swedes, Danes and Estonians moved forward with practical cooperation, and initial operations were therefore conducted in Estonia. The Lithuanians also undertook some less extensive activity, while the other participants decided mostly to wait and observe.
The Academy was based on the principle that all participating organizations should provide resources: either finances, personnel, or both. For Estonian unionists who backed the plan, personal contacts and the history of cooperation overcame their initial scepticism:
In the beginning... I did not totally agree and I was not interested in taking part [in the BOA]. But from the Finnish side... I cannot say that they pressured me, but they said 'How come you are not taking part?' We were old friends, right? (AEEWTU official,
March 2015)
In addition to personal relations, Estonian unionists cited low and declining membership, difficulty concluding collective agreements, financial hardship, and trends towards subcontracting threatening their future membership, as motives for joining. Even after BOA was initiated, its advocates had to 'sell' it to other staff in their unions. Organizing was alien to many Estonian unionists and it needed to be framed in a way which would overcome the resistance of those sceptical about aggressive social movement tactics and symbolic protest. One unionist relates how some unionists reacted to these For the Estonians, introducing the BOA meant organizational transformation. Although some unionists were directly involved in the transnational cooperation, to succeed the organizing model needed domesticization into wider union circles, involving unionists who had not previously been involved. More dramatically, they had to be willing to try different ways of approaching workers and employers. For the Finnish unions, the decision was perhaps easier, since their initial commitment was primarily financial. Benford and Snow (2000) relate that framing can involve diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational aspects, which Finnish and Estonian organizing model advocates undertook together. The organizing model was first promoted in Estonia as a way to prevent Estonia becoming a union-free zone; Finnish adoption began later. One Estonian and one Finnish trade unionist who had studied the model and initiated the project became its main advocates. They diagnosed low union density and passive social partnership/servicing unionism as problems, framing the organizing approach as the only way to 'save' Estonian unions. They publicized successful examples from other countries. This signalled a move away from the previous 'big brother mentality', as the Finnish model was no longer exemplary.
The next aspect was prognostic framing or 'the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, or at least plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan' (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616) .
The main BOA initiators laid out detailed plans for the 'Organizing Academy' which was introduced during numerous formal and informal meetings with union officials. They prepared training materials, so those who took part had a ready-made package to follow. Finally, motivational framing provided a 'rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action' (ibid: 617), like emphasising the need to end the downward membership spiral, the interdependency of labour markets, mutual obligations and 'being in the same boat'. The Finnish Metalliliitto also emphasised the failure of the scattered campaigns and initiatives initiated by the Finnish unions in Estonia in the past, admitting that that despite long-standing cooperation between Metalliliitto and EMAF they had gained few new members: 'We can keep them alive in that sense, the EMAF, but it doesn't lead us anywhere. We should do something differently.' (Metalliliitto official #1, January 2015). The well-planned BOA initiative rationalized various union efforts and brought them under one strategic vision. A cadre of committed individuals initiated BOA through personal contacts built from past cooperation, and then set about domesticating the strategy through diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. This was solidified and sustained through collective action, described in the following section.
Engaging in collective action: BOA's organizing in Estonia
Campaign work started in Estonia in May 2012. The idea was that the Finnish (and to a lesser extent also Danish and Swedish) unions support the Estonians financially, through strategic information, and sometimes solidarity. The Estonians set up a campaign office, and planned and executed campaigns.
Training was supported by all the partners. All participants committed to re-investing at least 35 per cent of campaign-generated membership fees into organizing (Häkkinen, 2013: 7) . Finnish unions made bilateral agreements with partner organizations. For example, PAM financed one Estonian organizer's salary, and contributed 10% of a Finnish official's work time in Finland. They promised also to support ETKA in negotiations by providing strategic information (PAM official, November 2014).
The approach followed the organizing model archetype closely. By the end of 2014 Estonia had seven BOA organizers in services, transportation and manufacturing. Organizers, in collaboration with Nordic colleagues, strategically targeted companies with few or no union members, but which they believed to be 'winnable'. Nordic companies were sometimes preferred because of the potential to pressure the Nordic management. They did not usually solicit Nordic union support openly, but the Nordic ownership may have accounted the Estonians' success at obtaining 'organizing neutrality agreements,' in which management agreed not to actively oppose unionization. The reason for Finnish unions' low profile was that in this way the Estonians could achieve and take credit for their own victories. Pressuring and picketing in Finland was available as a back-up strategy (PAM's official, November 2014). Picketing by Estonian workers in Finland played a role in winning neutrality from a Finnish hotel company in 2015, and then a collective agreement in 2016.
As is typical in the organizing model, the most important element was one-on-one conversations with workers, to determine the most important bargaining issues, to explaining what a union is, and to build workers' confidence in collective solutions. Organizing in a post-soviet context has its challenges: the younger generation generally had no knowledge of trade unions, while older employees still associated unions with their Soviet-era function of distributing goods given by the state. These one-on-one conversations also promoted a collectivist worker mentality versus the employer:
[During organizing conversations organizer explains to the workers that] you basically have no other options [than the union] to improve your working life. You cannot stand and wait for the employer to come and pat you on the shoulder, say 'good job, next month I will give you 100 Euros more'. Those kinds of things do not happen. They are making profit, why should they change anything? (BOA organizer #2, October 2014)
Worker passivity and fear of employer retaliation made organizing difficult. As is common elsewhere, Estonian employers used ideological manipulation, such as labelling unions as communists and more direct opposition, such as inviting workers to one-on-one talks to pressure them not to join.
A high priority was recruiting 'natural leaders', who organize other workers and eventually maintain union structures that can survive and grow after the organizer has left. Legally only five members are required to set up a union. In practice, however, campaigns aimed to build high density on-site organizations, with elected shop stewards and board members, committed members, the ability to use industrial action when necessary, and to sign a company-specific collective agreement (Häkkinen, 2013: 11) . Organizers started by organizing enough workers to have leverage over the employer, and only then contacted the employer. Campaigns also had other elements, depending on the specific vulnerabilities of employers, including employee petitions, wearing signs to express union support, picketing, and media pressure to draw attention to aggressive employer conduct.
Organizing Successes in Estonia
The BOA's annual report shows that by November 2014, in the third year of operations, 1234 new members had joined, 48 new shop stewards were recruited and 15 new self-sustaining branches were set up in Estonia (BOA, 2014) . The aggregate numbers may seem small, but it is important to remember the total population of Estonia is only 1.3 million, and the labour movement is starting from a very low baseline.
During this initial period, most successes were in manufacturing and transportation, while services saw less success. Partly, this was because the starting situation in that sector was so bad. Despite this, PAM continued to underwrite ETKA's campaigns, because of what they saw as positive signs at targeted firms. Officials from PAM also emphasized that 2012 to 2014 was a learning period, during which the Estonian organizers' professionalism increased (PAM official, November 2014).
Preliminary numbers from 2016 now suggested that this patience paid off; ETKA, which had two organizers, organized 160 new members in that period (Mölder, 2016) .
The best example of BOA strategy's success is actually its spillover effect -or frame diffusion (Benford and Snow, 2000: 627) 
The Spread to Finland
The BOA has been a mutual learning process for the Finnish and Estonian unions, influencing the strategies of Finnish unions as well. Finnish and Estonian industrial relations contexts and organizing challenges are different. While Estonian workplaces are usually poorly organized, in Finland poorly organized workplaces are rare. Nonetheless, Finnish unions have been concerned about a lack of member engagement (i.e. the need for internal organizing), and many family firms and entrepreneurs remain staunchly non-union (Laurokari, 2016) . Arnholtz et al. (2016) describe the Danish case, which is in many ways similar to the Finnish one. In that context, rank and file mobilization to establish union representation in previously unorganized workplaces has been virtually unknown in recent decades. The main issues which inspire mobilization in low-density contexts are usually already addressed in Denmark. Contracts are agreed at the industry level and workers have access to union representation if they want it. While unions see worker mobilization as necessary to build power resources to maintain and improve conditions, guaranteed representation promotes a passive mentality in the workers (Arnholtz et al., 2016) .
Finnish unions also benefit from high-density passive recruitment environment, where members come to the union for unemployment benefits and representation services, rather than the union coming to them. This promotes membership, but discourages engagement. As with the Danish organizing advocates (Arnholtz et al., 2016) , Finnish organizing model advocates pointed out that organizing is not alien to Finland, but rather invokes methods and ideologies of the labour movement's formative years (Pietarinen, 2014) , drawing on this older tradition to legitimate organizing. One of the BOA initiators, Mika Häkkinen (2016: 12) 
Conclusions
This article seeks to explain how Finnish and Estonian union have overcome the double barrier to transnational organizing cooperation through identity work. The study concludes that the underlying need to increase union leverage has provided motivation to try the organizing model, but it could only be successfully implemented through an extended process of identity work, in which old ideas about national jurisdictions and social partnership have been contested by new ideas of international cooperation and aggressive campaigning. Finnish unions' motives first and foremost have been related to the competitive threat posed by competition from non-union Estonians. For Estonian unions, the BOA has been a reaction to declining membership. Despite the bargaining logic, the change of strategy has been neither automatic nor inevitable, but has required extensive identity work on both sides of the Gulf of Finland.
Furthermore, the organizing model ideas have been tested in action, as successful identity work to (re-)construct identities presumes simultaneous processes of framing and engagement in collective action (Snow and McAdam, 2000) . Personal contacts and long-established cooperation have played a central role in beginning and sustaining the BOA. The Finnish unions have given the Estonian unions resources, but also taken a step back and let the Estonians run the campaigns, so that it has been a mutual learning process, rather than being dominated by the stronger union movement. The Estonian unions had to justify the trust put in them by assuming the organizing model agenda. This trust and commitment was only possible because of the years of identity work preceding the BOA. The Scandinavians lack such strong bond with Latvia and Lithuania, explaining why the Academy has not enjoyed similar success there.
The need for a new, dynamic strategy had been advocated by a few 'old-school' Finnish and Estonian trade unionists who had studied the model elsewhere in Europe, and believed it could work in Baltic and Nordic countries as well. This underlines the importance of agents in promoting ideas of change (Hauptmeier and Heery, 2014) , the need for constant identity work to (re-)create common understandings and objectives (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2012) and the socialization of old and new union members into accepting these. As the approach is considerably different from how unionists' have seen their and their organizations' role this far, it takes skilful framing (e.g. referring to organizing as return to the origins for Finnish unions, or as an only way to save Estonian unions) by the main advocates of the approach to legitimize the more confrontational strategy and ensure its continuity.
Identity work is a contested process and some changes are easier to achieve than others, depending on their fit with the past frames and narratives of those whose views are to be changed. Older generation partnership-servicing oriented unionists might see the need to organize, but confronting and pressuring employers is another and more difficult step. This generates tensions between those favouring more aggressive organizing and those who cling to existing union identities. The latter group opposes aggressive tactics, even when these clearly bring gains for workers. To certain extent the BOA has resolved this by being organizationally separate from other parts of the union movement, allowing freedom of action and limiting opposition, at the cost of making the number of 'identity work subjects' smaller. If the model is to become general it is necessary to reconnect it to the rest of the union movement. This is probably the BOA's most crucial future challenge.
